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In classical Greek tragedy, excessive self-
confidence (hubris) is usually followed by 
catharsis: the dawning awareness of past errors 
and the emotional purification this entails. One 
may wonder whether the UK general election on 
12 December 2019 will provide such a moment. 
Regarding Brexit, there has been plenty of hubris 
to go around in the UK as well as in the EU. Early 
British dreams about the Brexit negotiations 
being a walk in the park have come to naught. 
Similarly, while the EU has remained remarkably 
coherent on Brexit, that same cohesion has been 
in short supply when approaching other debates 
relating to the EU’s own future. Yet there is a 
chance that the UK general election will offer an 
opportunity to turn the page. 
With respect to the question of EU membership 
the UK general election promises to offer a fairly 
binary choice. Notwithstanding other salient 
topics such as the future of the National Health 
Service, UK voters confront a choice on 
advancing Brexit – or not. A clear win for the 
Conservative Party will deliver the revised deal 
that Boris Johnson has negotiated. In contrast, a 
hung parliament or an outright victory for Labour 
or for the Liberal Democrats is likely to continue 
the Brexit stalemate. This may eventually lead to 
the outcome of the 2016 referendum being 
reversed. Regardless of where every UK citizen 
stands on Brexit, the ballot paper will have 
offered everyone a say in the outcome. In 
addition, the public debate leading up to this 
election has been long and intense. In contrast to 
the 2016 referendum, the issues have been 
scrutinized at length, the electorate has been 
widely informed about what EU membership 
On 12 December 2019, UK voters confront 
another choice whether to advance Brexit or 
not. More than three years after the 
referendum, all issues have been scrutinized 
and the collective effort that Brexit requires 
has become clear. Apart from involving the 
public in the most momentous choice in the 
orientation of UK foreign policy in decades, 
the general election provides a useful 
opportunity for the UK and the EU to take 
stock of the shortfalls of their negotiating 
strategies and to contemplate future 
scenarios. The UK and the EU have a 
common interest in maintaining a 
cooperative relationship whilst they search 
for ways to address the democratic demands 
they both face. 
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actually entails, and also what effort ‘leaving the 
EU’ will demand. Critics will point out that this 
debate has been contaminated by deception and 
demagoguery. That is true, but when has 
democracy ever been devoid of attempts to win 
the battle of competing narratives? Also, this 
general election can fail to produce a definite 
outcome. Even so, it will have the merit of 
involving the public in the shaping of a 
momentous choice in the orientation of British 
foreign policy. 
This European Policy Brief highlights the 
challenges and opportunities the UK and the EU-
27 face in dealing with the Brexit conundrum 
before and after the election. It does not provide 
voting advice to UK citizens, nor does it advocate 
specific EU positions. Rather it seeks to highlight 
in what ways the UK and the EU have been 
caught up in overestimating their own negotiating 
position. Given that this has produced stalemate 
– on Brexit and on other matters – the election 
provides a window through which the EU and 
the UK can contemplate different futures. 
Whatever outlook one may prefer, a broadly 
cooperative relationship in terms of trade, 
security and foreign policy remains a core interest 
for the UK as well as for the EU. 
A GLOBAL BRITAIN DEVOID OF GLORIOUS 
DREAMS 
One striking feature of the Brexit negotiations is 
the extent to which different UK negotiation 
teams, boisterous at first, have been worn down 
by the technocratic grit of the European 
Commission’s Task Force 50. Most assessments 
of the Withdrawal Agreement suggest that the 
European Commission has been particularly 
successful in protecting the EU’s core interests 
vis-à-vis the UK.1 Apart from the revisions 
relating to the customs status of Northern 
Ireland, which are much more significant from a 
domestic UK than from an EU perspective, the 
changes brought about by Boris Johnson’s 
leadership have been minimal. In addition, the 
Political Declaration left much of the future 
relationship open for subsequent clarification or 
review. If the UK has been humbled by the 
Commission’s negotiating prowess, this has been 
largely due to a dangerous overconfidence about 
how easy it would be to leave the legal order that 
the UK had become so enmeshed in for over 
forty years.2  
The UK has traditionally maintained a foreign 
policy outlook that ranged far beyond the 
European continent. Correspondingly, its 
relationship to European integration has been 
qualitatively different from that of the founding 
member states, its interests wider and its 
diplomatic approach more transactional. The 
UK’s global outlook is both a source of 
inspiration for the EU and a handicap for 
negotiating the future relationship. After all, this 
requires reconciling the UK’s perspective with 
the EU’s more inward-looking approach, which 
cannot help but being curtailed by 27 different 
national agendas. Yet the challenge for the UK 
resides not simply in articulating a grand vision of 
a novel, post-Brexit foreign policy. The UK’s 
departure from the EU itself requires a legal and 
administrative effort of colossal scale. When it 
comes to trade negotiations, this is precisely the 
sort of governmental bureaucracy that EU 
member states have successfully outsourced to 
the European Commission. Unsurprisingly, the 
European Commission has mastered the 
technical detail that Brexit requires much better 
and earlier than any UK government could ever 
have – even if it would dramatically boost the 
capacity of the UK’s own civil service. 
Yet the reality of any British foreign policy post-
Brexit cannot escape the tyranny of geography. 
The trading relationship the UK enjoys with the 
EU is far more significant than any other 
relationship. In 2018, the UK trade in goods and 
services with the EU-27 accounted for 45% of 
exports and 53% of imports.3  Through NATO 
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and other forms of security cooperation, UK 
national security is deeply intertwined with that 
of most EU member states. These realities 
cannot be ignored without damaging the core 
material interests of both the UK and the EU. 
Ensuring the UK’s political well-being may well 
require recalibrating its relationship with the EU 
along a different trajectory than full EU 
membership. Yet this requires a spirit of 
cooperation that is all too often hidden from view 
by the popular desire to return to the days of 
former glory. As the vexing Irish question has 
shown, the EU will throw its full weight behind 
its individual member states when one of these 
has a vital interest at stake. 
The UK’s confidence in its ability to navigate the 
emerging international system better alone may 
be warranted or not. Either way, the UK will need 
to grow the administrative means to do so, or risk 
being outflanked by larger and more capable 
actors overseas. By its very consociational nature, 
the EU will not be the most formidable 
counterpart the UK will encounter. Furthermore, 
a novel and cooperative relationship remains a 
shared interest between the UK and the EU – 
unlike the designs that more distant actors may 
have for the European continent as a whole. 
MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE EUROPEAN 
WALL 
The EU’s own form of hubris has been a mirror 
image of the UK’s. Instead of drawing strength 
from a clear-eyed foreign policy outlook, the EU 
has relied on the formidable negotiating strengths 
of the European Commission. In turn, the latter 
relied on its technocratic mastery of legal and 
administrative detail. Like the UK, the EU has 
been initially tempted to believe that this 
approach would deliver the desirable outcomes – 
i.e. preventing Brexit or at least mitigating its 
negative consequences for the EU to the 
minimum. The Commission and, by extension, 
the Union have been successful in doing so, albeit 
at the risk of ignoring broader trends affecting the 
European political architecture. As the post-
Maastricht period in which the EU could expand 
hand in hand with economic globalization has 
arguable come to a close, the key challenge for 
the EU is to strike a new balance between its 
institutions and its member states for pursuing 
integration in an environment that is intrinsically 
more hostile to multilateralism than most 
Europeans would prefer. This will be easier to 
accomplish with the UK as a cooperative partner 
than as a resentful ex-member. 
Even if the EU has not consciously sought to 
‘punish the UK’ for Brexit and invoking Article 
50, its technocratic mastery of the negotiations 
implied that the brutal face of reality was all too 
often that of the EU negotiators. Protecting the 
integrity of the single market constituted a 
common interest that provided the Council with 
a much-needed sense of cohesion. Indeed, the 
Brexit negotiations have been an educational 
experience about what it precisely means to be an 
EU member state, both for the UK and for the 
EU itself. All other EU member states calculated 
that being inside the EU-27 was much preferable 
to being an exiting member state. If the UK with 
its much-vaunted civil service was struggling like 
this with implementing Article 50, even seasoned 
EU watchers came to the conclusion that leaving 
the EU amounts to mission impossible.4  Last but 
not least, the eventual outcome of the 
negotiations on the Withdrawal Agreement 
strengthened a sense that the approach chosen by 
the EU had been the right one. The narrow 
financial and legal interests of the EU and its 
citizens were thereby adequately provided and 
accounted for. 
In a wider sense, however, the negotiating 
success of the EU shrouds fundamental 
challenges of a political nature. The cohesion that 
the Council and the Commission put forward in 
the Article 50 negotiations has proven to be the 
exception to the rule. This display of unity cannot 
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shroud the fact that the EU has not put forward 
much vision on the future EU-UK relationship 
either. Even with a zero tariff, zero quota and 
zero dumping free trade agreement in place, 
Brexit remains a lose-lose proposition. Has the 
considerable ingenuity of the European 
institutions already been exhausted? Beyond 
Brexit, the debate on the common future of the 
EU-27 has not advanced much either. The 
discussion on future EU enlargement has 
dissolved into acrimony. The negotiations on the 
next Multiannual Financial Framework are 
becoming more painful than ever – not the least 
as a result of the continued uncertainty on the 
size of any potential future UK contribution. Last 
but not least, President Macron’s derogatory 
comments about NATO being ‘brain-dead’ have 
fuelled growing distrust about French designs for 
strengthening European defence – and perhaps 
more broadly so.5 Overall, the trend is clear. 
Member states are engaging actively in European 
policy debates, yet often end up disagreeing with 
one another on key principles and the application 
thereof. Moreover, the intergovernmental aspect 
of European integration has become much more 
pronounced again, even if a sizeable part of the 
EU bureaucracy refuses to acknowledge this 
reality.6 
At heart, the challenge for the EU is to come to 
terms with a political environment in which the 
relationship between member states and the 
Union is being redefined. The changing balance 
of power in the international system, the 
associated rise in geopolitical competition and the 
growing backlash against economic globalization 
are fueling a debate within all European societies 
about the role of the state and the role of the EU 
in dealing with these issues. In that sense, the 
British unease about EU membership may be no 
more than a particularly British manifestation of 
a wider trend that can be seen elsewhere in the 
EU as well. The stronger emphasis on the 
intergovernmental dimension is then also to be 
understood as a manifestation of the growing 
politicization of European policies. The backlash 
against technocracy that is on full display in the 
UK today is manifesting itself elsewhere too. 
Correspondingly the remaining EU-27 member 
states need to identify adequate safety valves for 
dealing with the pressure this generates. 
Maintaining a cooperative relationship with the 
UK can help Member States come to terms with 
democratic pressures they experience in their 
own domestic arena. Having plunged into 
democratic chaos first, the UK may also be the 
first to discover a new equilibrium and offer a 
source of inspiration to others. 
WHAT DEMOCRATIC CATHARSIS? 
Free and fair elections constitute an elementary 
component of any democratic system of 
government. By themselves they do not suffice 
for keeping democracy alive: this also requires the 
rule of law, the separation of powers, the 
presence of free media and the right of free 
speech. Yet elections are of critical importance in 
releasing societal tensions because they allow for 
regime change or regime empowerment by 
peaceful means. This may be well be what is 
called for in the context of Brexit. The outcome 
of the non-binding 2016 referendum on EU 
membership pointed towards such a profound 
change to the UK’s international orientation that 
validation by consecutive elections constitutes a 
democratic imperative. As the 2017 general 
election did not provide neither a clear-cut 
choice, nor a determinate outcome, another 
election was now overdue. 
The 12 December 2019 general election provides 
a first opportunity for the UK electorate to 
review the referendum outcome head-on. By 
now, it is reasonably well-understood what 
leaving the EU really means – even if the future 
relationship remains largely to be determined. 
Will the magnitude of the Brexit challenge deter 
voters from voting for Boris Johnson – and 
thereby for the agreement he has struck? What 
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will be the long-term outcome and political costs 
if neither of the political parties achieves a 
majority on the basis of which it could aspire to 
govern? Whilst one can only speculate about such 
futures, one thing is beyond doubt, namely that 
democracy is very much alive in the UK – with 
all the messy politics that entails. Even if the 2019 
general election does not settle the debate on 
Brexit, another election will eventually follow. 
For the EU-27 it may be frustrating to have to 
wait for political developments in the UK to 
materialize. At the same time, the time this 
generates can be put to good use in other ways. 
After all, the incoming president of the European 
Commission has promised ‘a new push for 
European democracy’. If the proposed 
conference on the future of Europe is to lead 
anywhere, considerable experience may be drawn 
from the UK example. It is difficult to dispute 
that the Brexit debate in the UK has drawn in civil 
society and young people and engaged voters in 
both civilized and raucous debates – in short, 
everything that can be democratically aspired to. 
Having substantial change in terms of policy 
outcomes at stake is actually a good thing for 
mobilizing public interest. At the same time, the 
relative procrastination with respect to delivering 
progress implementing Article 50 offers a sharp 
reminder that technical details have to go hand in 
hand with a convincing political vision for the 
future. If the UK has fallen short on one side of 
the equation – ignoring much of the technical 
detail – the EU may well have erred on the other 
side by paying insufficient attention to the overall 
political and strategic picture. 
 
At the end of any convincing performance of 
Greek tragedy, the leading characters – if still 
alive – experience catharsis and come to 
newfound wisdom. But they are not alone: the 
audience is an active participant in this process of 
theatrical purification too. In much larger 
numbers than before, citizens across the EU are 
starting to see what European integration actually 
means. The benefits that EU membership 
generates, as well as the price it entails, are 
coming under much greater scrutiny than before. 
These citizens are likely to want a vote and a 
democratic voice too. As such, the exact 
relationship between different levels of 
governance in the European political architecture 
is becoming the subject of debate in a way that 
has not been the case since the Maastricht Treaty 
established the EU itself. In the widest sense, the 
escalation of democracy in the UK matters to the 
EU as a whole because, irrespective of the 
outcome, it establishes a precedent that carries 
meaning across the continent. Paradoxically, is 
this not what bringing ‘ever closer union’ 
amongst the peoples of Europe was all about? 
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